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NOTE
RULE 11: WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
The American system of jurisprudence is based on a concept
of fundamental fairness for all parties involved., Embodying this
concept are the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution, which restrict governmental actions depriving
any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."2 Exactly what "process" is required is not a static concept,
but is dependent upon various facts and circumstances, including
the nature of the deprivation that will take place.' The United
States Supreme Court, charged with ensuring that due process is
afforded, has been given the authority by Congress to promulgate
rules for the procedure and operation of the courts.4 Pursuant to
See J. GORA, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 10 (1978). "Fundamental fairness" is the bench-
mark for the rights and procedures required by due process. See id.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause guarantees that a
person will receive "process" if the government deprives that person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1, at 452 (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. When such an appropriation is to take place, a
person is entitled "to a fair procedure to determine the basis for, and legality of, such ac-
tion." Id. It is not sufficient that the government's action is detrimental to a person; it must
be a taking of life, liberty, or property before some type of process is required. Id. When
such interests are at stake, the individual is justified in demanding a fair procedure. Id. The
form of the procedure to be granted must be determined with regard to "what procedures
are both necessary and affordable for proper resolution" of the action. Id. If the taking is
not within the range of interests protected, a person is not entitled to a procedure to deter-
mine his rights. Id. § 13.2, at 453; see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 570-72 (1972). The exact definition of these interests "is not infinite" but property
encompasses more than actual ownership of traditional ideas of "property." Id.
3 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575-76 (1975). "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
' See Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)). The Supreme Court was given the authority to promulgate "by gen-
eral rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and proce-
dure of the district courts ... of the United States in civil actions .... Such rules shall not
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this grant of authority, in 1938 the Court adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Rule 1 notes that the goal of the Rules is
"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."'6 Although the Rules have contributed to our system by
increasing accessibility to the courts, this e.ase of access has also
tended to backlog the system.7 Realizing this, the Supreme Court
amended certain rules in 19838 to grant district court judges the
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right[s] .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
5 FED. R Civ. P. (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C.A. (1982 & West Supp. 1988)).
'FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
7 See Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8
(1984). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instituted notice pleading, replacing particu-
larized pleading, "which deterred suits by requiring enough knowledge and preinstitution
investigation to enable the plaintiff to make specific allegations regarding the defendant's
conduct." Id. The "liberal and permissive" rules allow easy access so that everyone can exer-
cise his right to a day in court. Id. In Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985), the court stated:
Our system of jurisprudence is designed to insure that all disputants with colora-
ble claims have access to the courthouse. Relatively low barriers to entry have,
however, generated an undesirable result-a deluge of frivolous or vexatious
claims filed by the uninformed, the misinformed, and the unscrupulous. These
claims clog court dockets and threaten to undermine the ability of the judiciary to
efficiently administer the press of cases properly before it.
Id.; see Burger, Foreword to LAWYERS CONFERENCE TASK FORCE ON REDUCTION OF LITIGATION
COST & DELAY, DEFEATING DELAY at vii (1986). In 1969, there were 112,606 filings in the
federal district courts. Id. In 1985, there were 307,582 filings while the number of judges
during this period increased by only fifty percent. Id. Professor Miller attributes this "litiga-
tion explosion" to four factors: (1) "the changing demography of the legal profession"; (2)
"the growth in substantive rights"; (3) "our egalitarian procedural system"; and (4) "eco-
nomic incentives to litigate." See Miller, supra, at 2-12.
8 See Amendments to Rules, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983). In 1983, the Supreme Court promul-
gated new rules 26(g), 53(f), and 72 to 76, and amended rules 6(b), 7(b), 11, 16, 26(a)-(b),
52(a)-(c), and 67. Id. The power to impose sanctions was expressly made mandatory for
violations of rules 11 and 26, and discretionary for violations of rule 16. FED. R. Crv. P. 11, 16
& 26. Rule 16, as amended, states that the court must, with limited exceptions, issue a
scheduling order. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The order will limit the time "(1) to join other par-
ties and to amend the pleadings; (2) to file and hear motions; and (3) to complete discov-
ery." Id. It also may include the "dates for conference before trial, a final pretrial confer-
ence, and trial," and "any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case." Id. If
this order is not obeyed, or a pretrial conference is missed, or an attorney is "substantially
unprepared to participate" in the conference, the court may impose upon the party "the
reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance . . . . including attorney's
fees." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
Rule 26 considers the methods, scope, and limits of discovery, and requires that every
request for discovery or response thereto be signed. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a), (b) & (g). The
signature acts as a "certification" that the attorney has read the document, that it is "war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law," that it is "not interposed for any improper purpose," and that it is not
"unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g). If the rule is vio-
lated, sanctions "may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses in-
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power to more efficiently manage the conduct of litigation from the
initial filing of pleadings to the actual trial of the matter.9
Rule 11, as originally adopted in 1938, was designed to dis-
courage the filing of frivolous or dilatory pleadings." The rule was
rarely invoked, however, and did not effectively deter abuses."
curred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
I See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems
in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1313-14 (1986).
These particular amendments, see supra note 8, were to aid the district courts in managing
litigation and also to stem the tide of pretrial abuse. See Nelken, supra, at 1313-14. Charles
Wiggins, a member of the Advisory Committee, stated that the amendments to the Rules
were intended to reduce "unneeded delay and unnecessary expense in litigation." Address
by Charles E. Wiggins, Annual Judicial Conference-Second Judicial Circuit of the United
States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.R.D. 161, 177 (1984). The amended rules were
implemented to address these problems in three ways: (1) by encouraging early judicial
management to facilitate the early disposition of cases; (2) by heightening the "accountabil-
ity" and "sharpen[ing] the awareness of the responsibilities of attorneys"; and (3) by deter-
ring noncompliance with the Rules by the consistent application of sanctions. Id. at 177.
Although the notion of extensive judicial management goes against the traditional concept
of a judge being a "neutral and passive arbiter," the changes were deemed necessary because
attorneys, on their own, were not efficiently conducting the pretrial phases of litigation. See
Miller, supra note 7, at 14-15.
'0 See Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding
Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 312 & n.97 (1986) (citing original text of
rule).
11 See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1976). The original rule's
primary purpose was to "regulat[e] lawyer honesty in pleading." Id. Its major deterring fac-
tor was that if the rule was violated, the pleading would be stricken and the action would
continue as if the pleading had not been served. Id. at 14. Additionally, if it was found to be
a wilful violation involving an attorney, the attorney was subject to disciplinary proceedings.
Id. One major problem with the enforcement of the rule was that no clear guidelines
emerged for the courts to follow. Id. at 5-14. The enforcement procedures of the original
rule were ambiguous and judges appeared hesitant to sanction attorneys. See S. KASSIN, AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 3-4 (1985). The most problematic part of the rule,
in regard to sanctioning attorneys, was that it required a showing of bad faith on the part of
the attorney at the time of his signing of the pleading. Id. at 3. The difficulty in proving
such a subjective belief sometimes forced the courts to simply accept an attorney's charac-
terization of his intent. See United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 445 (D. Neb. 1950) ("court
is compelled to accept [the attorney's] assurances as being tendered in good faith"); Note,
supra note 10, at 313. With the subjective standard, "there [was] no position-no matter
how absurd-of which an advocate [could] not convince himself." Wells v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 101 F.R.D. 358, 359 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated, 106 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Be-
cause of confusion as to the applicable standards and "appropriate disciplinary action," and
the courts' reluctance to strike pleadings, the rule was rarely invoked and was not consid-
ered effective in deterring abuse. See 1983 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Advisory Committee, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-99 (1983) [hereinafter Advisory Committee's
Note]. In a study conducted for the Federal Judicial Center, it was found that in the period
from 1938 to 1979, there had only been eleven reported cases in which rule 11 motions had
been granted. See S. KASSIN, supra, at 2.
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When amended in 1983, the rule's scope was enlarged to encom-
pass not only pleadings but also "motion[s] or other paper[s]" and
called for the mandatory imposition of "appropriate sanction[s]"
for its violation, including the awarding of "a reasonable attorney's
fee."' 12 While these sanctions, which may be levied on an attorney,
his client, or both,"' have generally been regarded as serving either
a punitive 4 or compensatory purpose,1 5 they also provide a deter-
rent to wilful violators"6 and may educate the unwary litigator in
12 See FaD. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name
.... A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading,
motion, or other paper .... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to har-
ass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ....
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
13 Id.
" See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 185 (1985). Judge Schwarzer states that "[t]he rule provides for sanctions, not
fee shifting. It is aimed at deterring and, if necessary, punishing improper conduct rather
than merely compensating the prevailing party. The key to invoking Rule 11, therefore, is
the nature of the conduct of counsel and the parties, not the outcome." Id. Judge Schwarzer
concedes, however, that monetary sanctions are designed to both penalize the offender and
compensate the aggrieved party. Id. at 201. He advises that the amount of the sanction
should be limited to the "consequential expenses and attorney's fees ... incurred 'because'
of the paper filed in violation." Id. at 203. Any amount in excess of this sum must be charac-
terized as a fine, requiring additional due process safeguards before imposition. Id. at 202.
"I See Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 34, col. 2. Professor Miller, who served as the Reporter for
the Advisory Committee of the 1983 amendments, and his coauthor suggest that even
though the rule refers to "sanctions," liability should be considered a "cost-shifting tech-
nique," requiring the violator to bear the burden of his adversary's expenses. Id. Viewing
the sanctions as compensatory in nature acknowledges "the fact that one of the injuries that
can occur in this society is the injury that is inflicted by the receipt of one's own lawyers'
bill." Address by Judge Charles Sifton, Symposium Sponsored by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York (Apr. 24, 1985), reprinted in Response to a Practitioner's Com-
mentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 28, 29 (1985).
11 See Nelken, supra note 9, at 1325. As a corollary to either compensation or punish-
ment, sanctions will serve as a deterrent from other violations. Id. But see CoMMIrME ON
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regard to the standard to which he will be held. 17 Although the
main purpose of rule 11 is to "streamline the litigation process,"'18
the Advisory Committee on the amendment feared it might en-
courage satellite litigation, which would undermine this goal.19 To
some extent, this fear has been realized by an increase in rule 11
litigation.20 A separate concern relating to the imposition of sanc-
tions is that due process requirements must be met.2 Unfortu-
nately, courts have offered little guidance to help resolve this latter
issue.22
This Note will discuss whether monetary sanctions beyond
quantifiable fees, costs, and expenses should be imposed for rule 11
FEDERAL COURTS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RULE 11: A PROGRESS
REPORT 21 (1986) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS] (reporting that judges in the
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York believe rule 11 has only minor impact on attor-
ney conduct).
17 See Schwarzer, supra note 14, at 201. Judge Schwarzer argues that many times a
small financial penalty or reprimand is appropriate and will serve the purpose of both deter-
rence and education. See id. In the case of a reprimand, publication enhances the deterrent
effect of sanctions and will further aid in educating the bar about expected standards under
rule 11. Id. at 202.
Within the courts themselves, there is no agreement on which view reflects the underly-
ing purpose of the rule. Compare Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1180 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (dual purpose of deterrence and punishment) with Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) ("to punish.., those who would manipulate the
federal court system for ends inimicable to those for which it was created"), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
'8 See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 11, at 198. An increase of sanctions
should result in discouraging abusive tactics and consequently lessen frivolous claims and
defenses. Id.
19 Id. at 201.
'0 See Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 205 (E.D. Ky. 1987). Satellite
litigation has been harder to limit than expected. Id. It was thought that there would be an
initial upsurge in the use of the rule and then a leveling off after two or three years. See
Address by Arthur Miller, Annual Judicial Conference-Second Judicial Circuit of the
United States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984). Between the date
the amended rule became effective, August 1, 1983, and December 15, 1987, there were 688
rule 11 decisions reported. See Vario, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 199
(1988). The number of reported district court decisions seems to have leveled, but the num-
ber of court of appeals decisions is still rising. Id.
The explosion in the number of rule 11 sanctioning proceedings is mainly attributed to
the use of the objective standard in determining whether there has been a violation of the
attorney's duty of reasonable inquiry. Id. Unfortunately, the objective standard is prone to
uneven application by individual judges with differing views. See Whittington, 115 F.R.D.
at 208 n.26.
"1 See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
2 In Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit
provided the most thorough consideration yet undertaken by any of the circuit courts of the
"procedures and standards" applicable to rule 11 motions. See id. at 1553.
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violations. Additionally, the constitutional due process aspects for
the imposition of these sanctions will be addressed. Finally, this
Note will suggest a procedural solution for the imposition of these
sanctions, keeping in mind the spirit and intent behind the rule.
SANCTIONS: PUNITIVE OR COMPENSATORY
Rule 11 states that a court may levy "an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay.., the amount of the reasona-
ble expenses incurred ... including a reasonable attorney's fee." 23
"Appropriate sanctions" has been interpreted by various courts to
include not only quantifiable costs, fees, and expenses, but also a
monetary sum in the nature of a fine.24 Although courts have
struggled to differentiate between an "appropriate sanction" and a
"punitive fine," confusion still exists.25
It is submitted that the amount of a monetary sanction im-
posed for violating rule 11 should not exceed the opposing party's
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred because of the viola-
tion. Although the Advisory Committee's Note is silent on this
point, it is suggested that the use of the phrase "including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee" is a limiting clause and not merely
illustrative.2
A major concern with the imposition of rule 11 fines is that
such sanctions may overlap the congressionally created penalty for
23 FED. R CIV. P. 11.
24 See, e.g., Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood, 117 F.R.D. 634, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (fine of
$5,000 imposed for failure to comply with court order); Olga's Kitchen of Hayward, Inc. v.
Papo, 108 F.R.D. 695, 700 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (in addition to paying attorneys' fees, costs,
and expenses, party and his counsel "also directed to pay the Clerk of the Court $1,000
because of the efforts required by [the judge] in response to their actions in this case"),
modified, 815 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1987); Itel Containers Int'l v. Puerto Rico Marine Manage-
ment, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96, 106 (D.N.J. 1985) ("modest" or "reasonable" fine of $5,000 "to
vindicate the dignity of the judicial process"); see also Mercury Serv., Inc. v. Allied Bank,
117 F.R.D. 147, 156 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In Mercury, the court held that "[i]n appropriate
circumstances, a district court may impose a punitive sanction for the filing of a paper that
lacks factual foundation and is intended to mislead the Court and opposing parties, even if
the paper does not significantly delay proceedings, because of the disrespect shown to judi-
cial process." Id.
25 See, e.g., Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983)
("[b]ecause the term 'fine' is generally associated in common parlance with criminal offenses
we utilize the term 'monetary sanction' to avoid this connotation").
"' See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 11, at 198. The Committee simply stated
that the rule is "expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to award expenses,
including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or
conducting litigation." Id.
1988]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:586
criminal contempt.27 Before a fine exceeding $500 may be imposed
for criminal contempt, a party has a right to a trial by jury.28 Both
legal commentators29 and courts30 have recognized that in some in-
stances a "sanction" under rule 11 may constitute a latent criminal
fine. Furthermore, since rule 11 was not promulgated by legislative
enactment, sanctions should be imposed with "restraint and dis-
cretion," rather than for punitive purposes.3 '
THE DUE PROCESS DILEMMA
It is undisputed that before a court can impose monetary
sanctions, due process must be afforded to the sanctioned party.2
27 See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). Criminal contempt involves the doing of an act prohib-
ited by the court while civil contempt is the refusal to do something that has been ordered
by the court. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368 (1966). A criminal contempt
fine is usually payable to the United States. See Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 70
(1st Cir. 1946).
28 See FED. R. CRim. P. 42(b).
29 See Schwarzer, supra note 14, at 202-03.
The criminal character of a fine brings into play additional due process safe-
guards.... To impose a fine under Rule 11 without extending the procedural
protections of criminal contempt proceedings risks reversal on appeal and is
inadvisable.
The safer course, therefore, is to limit sanctions to consequential expenses
and attorney's fees, i.e., those incurred "because" of the paper filed in violation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
There is also the possibility that when a court wishes to punish a party, rule 11 will be
invoked "to circumvent the due process safeguards to which a party is entitled before crimi-
nal sanctions are imposed." See Nelken, supra note 9, at 1338.
20 See In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
450 (1987). A monetary sanction may indirectly constitute a criminal fine if, for example,
the amount imposed is grossly disproportionate to the attorney's actions. Id. at 1180. Addi-
tionally, if during the time while the action was pending it became evident that the attorney
and the judge were personal adversaries, the nature of the sanction must come under closer
scrutiny. Id. at 1181. If it is found that the sanction constitutes a criminal fine, "additional
due process safeguards are called into play." Id. "[T]his point bears special emphasis lest
the specter of satellite litigation trample the due process rights that the targets of judicial
sanctions undeniably possess." Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (Johnson, J., concurring).
21 See Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 573-74 (3rd Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(Sloviter, J., dissenting). In Eash, the dissent argued "that it is Congress . . . and not the
judiciary that has the power to establish crimes and penalties .... A monetary sanction
unrelated to the other parties' costs is a fine, and a fine can be imposed only to punish
conduct that has been prohibited by the legislature." Id. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
32 See, e.g., Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 11, at 201 ("procedure obviously
must comport with due process requirements"); see also Sanko S.S. Co. v. Galin, 835 F.2d
51, 53 (2d Cir. 1987) (procedure for imposing sanctions "must comport with due process
requirements"); Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1558 (sanctions under rule 11 are interests qualify-
ing for due process protection).
RULE 11
In its barest form, procedural due process requires both notice and
an opportunity to be heard.33 It is only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances that these protections need not be afforded. 34 The ex-
tent of the due process that must be given is not rigid and depends
The fact that the party or attorney is generally sanctioned for acts done in a judicial
proceeding is irrelevant in determining whether due process notice must be afforded. See
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354-55 (1871). As the Supreme Court stated in
Bradley, a case concerning the disbarment of an attorney:
[E]xcept where matters occurring in open court, in presence of the judges, consti-
tute the grounds of its action, the power of the court should never be exercised
without notice to the offending party of the grounds of complaint against him, and
affording him ample opportunity of explanation and defence. This is a rule of
natural justice, and is as applicable to cases where a proceeding is taken to reach
the right of an attorney to practice his profession as it is when the proceeding is
taken to reach his real or personal property.
Id.
These due process considerations are only applicable in instances where monetary sanc-
tions are imposed, not where the attorney is merely reprimanded, since a reprimand is
merely an injury to reputation, not a deprivation deserving due process protection. See CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 2, § 13.4, at 470. Injury to reputation alone is not considered a
protected interest; however, when the injury is of such magnitude that it will prevent a
person from pursuing a significant range of employment opportunities, due process rights
are applicable. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
13 See Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1983).
Affording attorneys procedural protections such as notice, an opportunity to be heard, or a
hearing will safeguard constitutional due process rights by guaranteeing that:
(1) the attorneys will have an opportunity to prepare a defense and to explain
their questionable conduct at a hearing; (2) the judge will have time to consider
the severity and propriety of the proposed sanction in light of the attorneys' ex-
planation for their conduct; and (3) the facts supporting the sanction will appear
in the record, facilitating appellate review.
Id.
I See Miranda, 710 F.2d at 522. A common "extraordinary circumstance" is a criminal
contempt action. Id. Such a summary proceeding is necessary only when there is a need to
defend the judicial system itself. Id. Even if it would be appropriate to disbar an attorney
for his contemptuous act, the disbarment would be subject to full due process protection.
Id.; see Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925). The Supreme Court has stated
that even contempt, "except of that committed in open court," requires that the person be
given notice of the charge against him, afforded the opportunity to present defenses, have
access to counsel, and be entitled to call witnesses. Id. The Court has stated that the need
for summary contempt proceedings arises when:
To preserve order in the court room for the proper conduct of business, the court
must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or
disrespect to the court when occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence
or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense.
Such summary vindication of the court's dignity and authority is necessary.
Id. at 534. The circumstances which allow a court to exercise its power for contempt are now
codified, see 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982), as is the procedure required for contempt actions. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b).
1988]
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on the circumstances as they are presented.35
Due process requires that the party against whom sanctions
are being considered receives notice of the contemplated action in
a form that apprises him of the reasons for the action. Since a
motion for sanctions can be raised by either opposing counsel or by
the court itself,3" the procedure for affording notice may vary.38
The Committee on Federal Courts of the New York City Bar
Association surveyed judges from the Southern and Eastern Dis-
tricts of New York to ascertain which notice procedures were most
commonly used. 9 The Committee concluded that lawyers com-
monly request the imposition of sanctions by adding them to other
motions that are presented to the court.40 Rarely were the motions
for sanctions made by separate motion or fully briefed.41 The Com-
mittee, in its recommendations, has suggested that all motions for
the imposition of sanctions "be made in writing, on notice, and
supported by separate factual and legal arguments." '42 Further-
more, the Committee has recommended that if such motions are
not in this form, they should not be considered.43 In its response to
the Committee's recommendations, the Standing Committee,
though discouraging the appending of rule 11 sanctioning motions
'* See Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988). In Szabo, under a rule 11 motion, counsel requested over
$10,000 in attorneys' fees. Id. The court recognized the importance of differentiating be-
tween foolish or obvious motions, and more significant and serious motions for rule 11 sanc-
tions. Id. "A serious Rule 11 motion is not a gnat to be brushed off with the back of the
hand. This motion was serious; it should have received serious attention." Id.; see also Don-
aldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("more serious the possible
sanction ... the more process that will be due"). See generally supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text (discussing "process" requirements).
" See infra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra note 12 (text of FED. R. Civ. P. 11). Before rule 11 was amended in 1983,
courts believed they had the implied right to raise the issue of sanctions sua sponte. See
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 11, at 200. The rule, as amended, makes this ex-
plicit. Id. Courts have not been hesitant to raise the issue. See Nelken, supra note 9, at
1328. For example, from August 1, 1983 to August 1, 1985, out of 233 cases in which sanc-
tions were considered, the court raised the issue sua sponte 30.6% of the time. Id.
11 See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 11, at 200. The Advisory Committee did
not explicitly state that notice should be in writing, only that the court and the offending
party should be notified. See id. It is suggested that a writing would prevent any confusion
or misunderstanding. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
11 See COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 16, at 24.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 34.
43 Id.
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onto other substantive motions, has contended that a rule requir-
ing all rule 11 motions to be in writing and fully briefed is too
rigid." The Standing Committee suggests that the decision to file a
separate rule 11 motion should be left initially to the moving
party; however, if the judge determines that more information is
required, he or she should have the discretion to request briefing of
the issue."
It is submitted that the courts should require the party who
moves pursuant to rule 11 to file a written notice with the court
and to serve it on the alleged violator, noting the specific docu-
ments that are believed to contravene the rule, the basis for the
motion, and the requested expenses, fees, or sanctions.46 Besides
satisfying the due process notice requirement, this procedure
would supply the sanctioned attorney with the particulars upon
which to base his defense47 and would facilitate any subsequent
appeal.48
" See COMMENTS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF CivnL LITIGA-
TION ON A REPORT BY THE FEDERAL COURTS CoMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK CONCERNING AMiENDED RULE 11, at 13 (1987) [hereinafter STANDING
COMMIrrrEE COMMENTs].
45 Id. at 13-14. The Standing Committee has asserted that when a motion for imposi-
tion of sanctions is raised, it can often be settled by a telephone conference, thereby elimi-
nating the time and expense required to brief and argue the matter. Id.
" See A.B.A., Trial Evidence Committee, Initial Draft-Rule 11 Standards, § m(5), at
52 (1988). Any party against whom sanctions are being considered must receive notice of the
sanction and the reasons for its imposition in order that due process be satisfied. See Don-
aldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). It must be "notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pen-
dency of the action." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950). Contained within the notice should be the amount of the attorney's fees requested,
broken down into hours spent and rate per hour for the personnel supplying the services.
See Pravic v. U.S. Indus.-Clearing, 109 F.R.D. 620, 623 (E.D. Mich. 1986). Rough estimates
of the time and money expended should not be accepted. See National Ass'n of Concerned
Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982); cf. Shrock v. Altru
Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 1987). In Shrock, the defendant moved for
attorney's fees under a civil rights statute, but the motion was denied by the district court.
Id. at 661. On appeal, the circuit court stated that the defendant would probably be entitled
to attorney's fees under rule 11 because the standard for awarding them is different than
under the civil rights statute. Id. at 661-62. However, the court ruled that the plaintiff had
not received adequate notice to defend against a rule 11 motion and the action was re-
manded. Id. at 662.
47 See Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1559-60. The notice aspect of due process requires that
the party be forewarned of the reasons why the imposition of sanctions is being considered.
Id. The notice need not be in the form of a complaint, id. at 1560, but it is suggested that
requiring a writing would have the beneficial effect of narrowing the issues to be argued and
decided at the subsequent hearing without further burdening the court.
48 Id.
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It is suggested that when the imposition of sanctions is raised
sua sponte by the court, care must be exercised in assuring that
sufficient notice is received by the party. One view is that the exis-
tence of the rule itself gives adequate warning of what is expected
from a party, thereby satisfying the requirement of notice for due
process purposes.4 9 The opposing viewpoint reasons that while the
rule sets forth the minimum standards that must be met for any
document filed, it fails to satisfy due process requirements because
it does not give the party notice of the specific reasons for which
rule 11 has been invoked.50
It is suggested that the view adopted by the Tenth Circuit, in
the context of sanctions for frivolous appeals, is the most efficient
means of affording notice to all parties involved. The Tenth Cir-
cuit requires the trial court to issue an order to show cause for not
imposing sanctions.5 The degree of specificity of notice depends
on the type of violation and the party to be sanctioned.2 As the
Supreme Court has declared, "[tihe adequacy of notice... respect-
ing proceedings that may affect a party's rights turns, to a consid-
erable extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show
such party. . . to have of the consequences of his own conduct. '53
The second major component of due process is an opportunity
to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '54
11 See id.; Rowland v. Fayed, 115 F.R.D. 605, 608 (D.D.C. 1987); see also Lepucki v.
Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 88 (7th Cir.) (while attorney may not know court will impose
sanctions, knowledge that court can impose them is sufficient notice), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
827 (1985).
90 See Tom Growney Equip., Inc. v. Shelley Irrigation Dev., Inc., 834 F.2d 833, 836 n.5
(9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing "between the general notice about sanctions [from rule 11]
and notice that sanctions are being considered").
11 See Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1515 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Braley in-
volved a "patently frivolous, multiplicious and vexatious" appeal, and consequently, the cir-
cuit court sanctioned the attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and FED. R. App. P. 38. See 832
F.2d at 1507. The court stated that when a court considers the imposition of sanctions sua
sponte, due process is satisfied by the issuance of an order to show cause why they should
not be imposed and by giving the party an opportunity to respond. Id. at 1515.
92 See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). Notice
should be more specific for violations of the rule grounded in an alleged lack of legal founda-
tion, as opposed to a document without a factual basis. Id. Furthermore, if sanctions are
being considered to be levied on the client alone, notice would also need to be more specific.
Id.
"' Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962).
" Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Every person is entitled
to a hearing prior to an adjudication that will result in a deprivation of property. Id.; see
also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (sanctions should not be im-
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The type of hearing that must be afforded is not "a technical con-
ception with a fixed content""5 but depends on a balancing of fac-
tors as identified by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge:56
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail."
It is submitted that, in the sphere of sanction hearings, there has
been neither a consistent application of procedure, nor develop-
ment of any objective standards for the types of penalties imposed.
To date, the schemes followed by the courts have ranged from a
full contempt-like hearing58 to no hearing at all.59
posed "without fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record"); Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (right to notice and hearing).
0' McGrath, 341 U.S. at 162 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). "The very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imagina-
ble situation." Id.
6 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
57 Id. at 335. The Court stated that when evaluating these factors, the cost of the sub-
stitute or additional protections may outweigh the benefits received by the individual and
society. Id. at 348. In the final analysis, the procedure should be designed with regard to
"the decision to be made, [and] to 'the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard' to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case." Id. at
349 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)).
"' See Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit,
however, has distinguished rule 11 sanctions from criminal contempt as follows: "'The for-
mer is an unjustified failure to carry out an administrative responsibility as an officer of the
court; the latter is an affront to the authority of the judge.'" Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d
1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (quoting Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710
F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1983)).
0 See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) (where judge
awarding sanctions has full knowledge of relevant facts, no hearing needed), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987); McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (plain-
tiff not entitled to hearing on whether sanctions should be levied or on their amount);
Brown v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1986) (where at-
torney's incompetence led to sanctions, no hearing needed).
Courts that have refused to grant a subsequent hearing have often asserted that it
would be of no value or that there was a violation of the rule as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560 (no additional notice beyond very existence of rule 11); Rod-
gers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1985) (no hearing required
where it would serve "no useful purpose"); Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 88 (7th
Cir.) (rule 11 constitutes sufficient notice), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
However, even if a court subscribes to the proposition that the mere presence of rule 11
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In denying a right to a hearing, some courts have relied on the
dictates of the Advisory Committee's Note.6 0 It is submitted that
denial of a hearing is both a violation of the due process clause and
contrary to the intent of the Advisory Committee. While the Advi-
sory Committee suggests that, when possible, the sanction proceed-
ings should be limited "to the record,"6 " this language must be
read in light of the principle that "discovery should be conducted
... only in extraordinary circumstances. 62 The various factors
bearing on what constitutes "reasonable inquiry" before a violation
has occurred should also be considered. 3 It is submitted that "on
the record" should not be read so narrowly as to encompass only
the record as it stands when a motion for rule 11 sanctions is
made; rather, it should be read to include the record after argu-
ments for and against their imposition are heard.",
The Committee on Federal Courts has stated that in certain
situations a "strong presumption" should exist in favor of granting
an evidentiary hearing.6 5 It has asserted that the party to be sanc-
tioned should be given the opportunity to provide any type of evi-
constitutes notice, the court still should not totally dispense with a hearing. See Tom
Growney Equip. v. Shelley Irrigation Dev., 834 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1987); Hill v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1206 (7th Cir. 1987) (Parsons, J., dissenting). The ultimate deci-
sion to impose sanctions rests with the court, but by not granting a hearing, "an assessed
sanction necessarily appears to be based on caprice or emotion, and not on a monitored
exercise of judicial discretion." Id.
60 See, e.g., Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1560 (noting that Advisory Committee's Note does
not contemplate hearing); McLaughlin, 803 F.2d at 1205 (limit sanction proceedings to rec-
ord; party not entitled to hearing); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No.
86-1238 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (must be "extraordinary
circumstances" to grant hearing); Rowland v. Fayed, 115 F.R.D. 605, 608 (D.D.C. 1987)
(limit to record to ensure that efficient operation of pleadings not offset by satellite
hearings).
6" See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 11, at 201.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 199. "Reasonable inquiry" depends on a consideration of the following. (1) the
time the signer had available for investigation; (2) whether the facts contained in the docu-
ment were provided by the client; (3) was the legal argument asserted based on "a plausible
view of the law;" and (4) did he rely on information provided by another attorney. Id.
64 See Miller & Culp, The New Rules of Civil Procedure: Managing Cases, Limiting
Discovery, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 5, 1983, at 23, col. 1. Professor Miller and his coauthor state that
the satellite litigation feared by the Advisory Committee was that which entailed discovery.
Id. at 34, col. 3. They suggest that normally, "only a short hearing . . . should be neces-
sary." Id. It is submitted that what the Advisory Committee sought to avoid was a full
evidentiary hearing.
65 See COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL CounTs, supra note 16, at 34. An example of such a
situation is when there is an issue of whether an attorney's pre-filing factual investigation
was sufficient. Id. at 34-35.
dence that it feels is appropriate to aid the court in coming to a
decision.'6 In contrast, the Standing Committee has opposed the
idea that a presumption should exist in certain situations, prefer-
ring that each case be decided individually by taking into consider-
ation whether there are underlying facts that should be brought
out and whether the sanctioned party has been given a chance to
explain his actions.6 7
To achieve the goals of rule 11, it is suggested that while there
should be a presumption against an evidentiary hearing, a party
should at least be allowed to submit briefs and affidavits, and pre-
sent oral arguments against the imposition of sanctions. 8 This will
allow the court to make a reasoned judgment, preserve an ade-
quate record for appeal, and ensure that the sanctioned party will
be afforded his due process guarantees.6 9
CONCLUSION
When amendments focusing on the pretrial activities of the
parties involved were made to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1983, it was felt that the action would streamline the litigation
process. Unfortunately, in the five ensuing years, this goal has not
been realized; indeed, in some ways the amended rule 11 has had a
detrimental effect on the efficiency of the litigation process. More-
over, in trying to attain this goal, due process safeguards have
sometimes been sacrificed through inconsistent application.
This Note has attempted to explore some of these inconsisten-
cies and to put forth proposals for the uniform application of sanc-
tioning procedures. Although this Note has concerned itself with
sanctions under rule 11, these proposals should be equally applica-
10 Id. at 34. This would include "briefs, affidavits, live testimony, or any other form of
evidence." Id.
See STANDING COMMITTEE COMMENTS, supra note 44, at 14.
6' See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983). The Supreme Court's admonition
in Hensley that a "request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation"
seems to favor a presumption against an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 437; see also Schwarzer,
supra note 14, at 198. Judge Schwarzer states:
[Olrdinarily the opposition will consist of an explanation and justification . . .
[and] can be adequately presented by memorandum and declarations. Oral argu-
ment may be helpful, even if not required by due process. An evidentiary hearing
would not seem to be necessary and should be avoided, unless the court must find
disputed facts or resolve issues of credibility.
Id.; see also Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1515 (10th Cir. 1987) (party to be sanc-
tioned should be allowed to file briefs or otherwise be heard).
"I See Miranda v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1983).
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ble to other sanctioning authority granted by the rules. It is sug-
gested that a new rule to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
similar to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(c),70 setting
forth the notice and hearing requirements to be followed for any
violation of the rules, be promulgated for all sanctionable acts.71
Stephen A. Stallings
70 See FED. R. App. P. 46(c). The rule states in pertinent part that "[a] court of appeals
may, after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and after a
hearing, if requested, take any appropriate disciplinary action against any attorney who
practices before it for ... failure to comply with these rules or any rule of the court." Id.
71 See Address by Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, Annual Judicial Conference-Second Ju-
dicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 30, 1983), reprinted in 101 F.R.D. 194, 196 (1984).
Judge Sofaer foresaw this problem shortly after the amendments were promulgated and
stated that "sanctioning authority should be provided in a clear way, not scattered all over
the Federal Rules, and we should be informed what procedures we have to use before we
may impose those sanctions." Id.
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